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THE EMERGENCE OF ART LAW 
LEGAL CHANCE MOST OITEN MIRRORS society's broader social, political, and 
economic developments.' As society becomes more complex the law 
evolves to meet additional needs, often by becoming more specialized. In 
recent years the consumer, environmental, and welfare movements, as well as 
the demands of the poor and disadvantaged for civil and economic rights, 
have led to changes in the law and to the development of new legal specialties. 
One area of the law which has most recently become sufficiently particular- 
ized to be considered a discrete legal specialty is art law. 
By art law we refer to the practices of traditional legal specialties such as 
commercial law, contracts, copyright, entertainment, interfiational law, labor 
relations, and tax law as they have evolved to meet the ever more particular 
needs of the visual artist. Traditionally, a work of art has been treated as any 
other chattel. As Franklin Feldman and Stephen E. Weil, authors of a leading 
reference work on visual art law, have.noted: 
A generation ago, most of the problems involving art works were 
resolved by recourse to some generalized body of law. The rules 
regulating the sale of an etching by Picasso were largely the same as 
those covering a sack of potatoes by a farmer. A museum might 
dispose of a painting from its collection with as little question as a 
hospital selling a used bed.2 
Today, American law relating to the arts has become more particular, and 
art law itself has developed into a discrete and increasingly recognized legal 
field. The Association of American Law Schools, for example, has created a 
section on art law. The American Law Institute presents yearly seminars in 
one aspect of art law, "Legal Problems of Museum Operations," which in the 
past year drew over 200 participants. A small but growing number of 
attorneys have specialized their practice in this area, and an increasing 
number of law schools, including Fordham, Harvard, Lewis and Clark, 
Stanford and Pace, are offering courses on art law. There are two case books 
on art law presently available and a third is expected in the next few months3 
The New York Law ]ournal, the daily paper of the New York legal 
community, publishes a bimonthly column on the topic, and law reviews have 
begun to present ~ymposia.~ 
A.B., A.M., Univ. of Pennsylvania; J.D. New York Univ.; Associate Professor of Law. Pace 
University School of Law. 
1 J .  HUFLST, HE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 295-301 (1950); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 584-91 (1973). 
S. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 5 (1974). 
S. FELDMAN and S. WEIL, supra note 2; L. DUBOFT, DESKBOOK F ART LAW (1977). A third 
casebook, LAW, ETHICS & THE VISUAL ARTS, has been prepared by Professors Albert Elsen and 
John H. Merryman of Stanford University and will be published by Matthew Bender. 
In addition to this symposium, see Elsen, Introduction: Why Do We Care About Art, 27 
HASTINGS L. J .  951 (1976); Symposium - Legal Aspects of the International Trafic in Stolen Art, 4 
SYRACUSE J .  INT'L & COM. 51 (1976). 
Heinonline 26 Clev. St.4!21 Rev. 481 1977 
482 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26: 481 
It is the purpose of this Article to examine the practical and legal origins of 
the field of art law, and to highlight principal legal questions which are of 
significant concern to the visual artist. 
The major factor in the development of art law has been the art explosion 
and cultural boom of the past twenty years. In the post-World War Two 
period, the art and auction markets shifted from Europe to the Unitedstates. 
Concomitant with this economic shift, new currents in art such as the 
development of abstract expressionism, pop art, and other visual arts move- 
ments arose on this side of the At lant i~ .~  New York's pre-eminence as the art 
market's center led to an increased interest in the arts and to coverage of art by 
the media. Despite somewhat sanctimonious protests of artists and others, 
art became in many ways more like other businesses - big business - and the 
marketing of Andy Warhol's Campbell Soup Can and other works became 
not that much different from the marketing of Campbell's soup. Art became 
an important commodity followed even by non-collectors, and auctions 
became chic events followed closely by the press and the p u b l i ~ . ~  
A. The New Collectors 
New patterns of collecting and art appreciation emerged in this period, 
and the interest of Americans in the arts crossed all cultural, political, social, 
and economic boundaries. The acceptance of the visual arts into the cultural 
mainstream is demonstrated in the corporate interest and support of modem 
art and architecture. In the past decade there has been a tremendous 
expansion in the number of museums, galleries, and collectors. The expan- 
sion of art collecting into the middle class was encouraged by the creation of 
new collecting art forms such as prints, posters, and photographs.' This not 
only greatly increased the dollar value of the art industry, but widened the 
possibilities of consumer a b u ~ e . ~  
B. Federal Funding of the Arts 
The intrusion of state and federal governments into the funding of the arts 
has been another important factor in the development of art law.9. Govern- 
mental funding has been followed closely by governmental regulation, which 
in turn has had a great effect upon the emergence of legal procedures and 
regulations in the arts and upon the ways in which arts organizations do 
For an interesting discussion of the art explosion in the United States in the last twenty years, 
see Warshaw, But Is It Art? The Artist In the Market, ART & THE LAW, Feb.-Mar. 1975, at 1. 
The 1973 sale at Southeby Park Bernet of Postwar and Contemporary Printings and 
Sculpture from the Collection of Robert C. Scull brought national media coverage and was made 
the subject of a movie, America's Pop Collector Robert C. Scull- Contemporary Art at Auction, 
produced by E. J .  Vaughriin 1974. 
Warshaw, supra note 5, at 3. 
See notes 30-37 infra. 
The funding of the National Endowment for the Arts has grown from $2,534,308 in 1966 to 
$123,500,000 in 1977-1978. 
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business. Fifty years ago the major responsibility of museum counsel was to 
insure that elderly patrons had made appropriate bequest provisions to the 
museum. Now, museum counsel are faced with a variety of legal problems 
similar to those of other complex institutions which receive federal and state 
funds.1° 
The infusion of government funding has created a variety of problems and 
forced reactions to federal regulations. Because of the amount of federal and 
state support, many museums can no longer be considered private institu- 
tions, but have become quasi-public; as a result, the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the Federal Constitution may be deemed to apply to 
everything from hiring policies to exhibitions." The governmental presence 
has forced museums to become aware of a variety of federally required 
programs for the handicapped,12 for employment,13 and for minorities.14 
Trustees and curators have been forced to define their responsibilities, and 
public officers such as attorneys general are becoming more concerned with 
the activities of so-called private institutions with self-perpetuating boards.15 
Related to this are demands for accountability of museums to the public. 
The legal complexities of museum operations have led to the creation of 
legal offices in many of the larger museums, and to the placement of lawyers in 
other institutions under less threatening titles such as "administrator." 
C. The Visual Art and the Law 
The artist, too, has been affected economically, politically, and socially by 
the changing status of the arts. As Robert Warshaw has noted, even more 
striking than the increase in the number of artists in America and the 
movement of the art-world center to the United States was the transformation 
which took place in the artist's socio-economic status. Arshile Gorky, Jackson 
Pollock, Willem de Kooning, Mark Rothko, and Adolph Gottlieb had all been 
on the rolls of the WPA's federal art project in the mid-1930's, receiving an 
average salary of ninety-five dollars per month. During the 1940's Rothko, 
Gottlieb, Barnett Newman, and Morris Louis were each supported by their 
working wives.ls 
During the 1960's and 1970's the artist became a cultural hero. Andy 
Warhol and Jamie Wyeth are members of cafe society. Jasper Johns and 
lo See ALI-ABA, LEGAL A s ~ m  OF MUSEUM OPERATIONS (1977). 
l 1  Malaro, Conduct of Museums Which May lnfringe Constitutional Rights, in ALI-ABA, 
LEGAL ASPELTS OF MUSEUM OPERATIONS 367,370 (1977); Ward, Sources For and Applicability of 
Constitutional Limitations on Museum's Freedom of Action, in ALI-ABA, LEGAL ASPECIS OF 
MUSEUM OPERATIONS 379 (1977). 
l2 Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. $793 (Supp. V 1975). 
l3 Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. $ UH)O(e)(l) (Supp. V 1975); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. $621 (1970). 
l4 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. $2000(d) (1970); Education Amendments of 1972,U) 
U.S.C. $ 1681 (Supp. V 1975). 
l5 Lefkowitz v. Museum of the American Indian Heye Foundation, No. 41416175 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1977). Weintraub, Museums with WaUs: Public Regulation of Deaccessioning and Disposal, 
ART & THE LAW, Feb.-Mar. 1975, at 1; H. HESS, THE GRAND ACQUISITORS (1974). 
Warshaw, supra note 5. 
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Robert Rauschenberg have lunched with Mrs. Mondale." The American 
artist is no longer an outcast. He has been incorported into mass society as a 
creator of consumer goods, with a new-found social status equal to that of a 
rock star or investment banker.ls 
This new social and economic status has thrust the artist into a business 
environment which differs greatly from the almost feudal patron relationships 
of the past and the "left bank" stereotype of his lifestyle. Artists were faced 
with legal problems similar to those of other businessmen. They began to 
play the role of manufacturer with respect to protecting their work against 
unauthorized reproduction, and the role of employee with the respect to 
protecting themselves against exploitation by employers. As business peo- 
ple, they shared the concerns of other affluent Americans in the areas of tax 
and estate planning. 
One lesson for artists from the litigation surrounding the estates of Mark 
RothkoIg and David Smithzo is the need to have competent counsel, with 
experience in representing artists, in drafting one's will. The tax consequen- 
ces to the artist's estate and to his art work, as well as the liabilities of his 
executors, are of such magnitude that casual estate planning is an invitation to 
litigation. Like investment bankers and rock stars, successful artists will 
increasingly be surrounded by a specialized coterie of attorneys, accountants, 
and agents. 
Not every visual artist, of course, has shared in this cultural boom. The 
number of individuals who call themselves "artists" is staggering; each year 
the American art educational system alone graduates 30,008 individuals who 
can call themselves artists.21 The vast majority of artists have not harvested 
the commercial rewards of the art boom. However, they have coalesced and 
like other disadvantaged groups begun to make. demands for recognition of 
artists' rights. 
11. THE ORIGINS OF SPECIALIZED TREATMENT 
OF ARTISTS AND WORKS OF ART 
A. Early Customs Court Definitions of Art 
The courts and legislatures have just begun to realize that the arts require 
special legal treatment, but officials of the Customs Court have been aware of 
the legal problems unique to art work since the nineteenth century. The court 
has had a particularly difficult time in defining what is "art," with the result that 
some fine art works have long received lower import duties than other itemsz2 
The court first employed a representational test, which was a most 
restrictive definition of "art" for legal purposes. As a result of the representa- 
tional test, the term "art" as defined by the t a r s  act did not cover the entire 
I7 See Arts and Taxes on the Menu o f  Mw. Mondale's Luncheon, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,1977, at 
16, col. 3. 
l8 Warshaw, supra note 5. 
le  In re Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d 74, 335 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1972). 
20 Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650 (1972). 
a Hughes, A Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists, TIME,  Mar. 11, 1974, at 65. 
e2 See generally L. DUBOFF, supra note 3; Tar8 Act of 1883, ch. 22, Stat. 513. 
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range of the beautiful and artistic, but only those artistic productions which 
could be characterized as "something more than ornamental or decorative 
[and] which may be properly ranked as examples of the free fine arts, or 
possibly that class only of the free fine arts imitative of natural objects as the 
artist sees them and appealing to the emotions through the eye alone."23 
In a legal context this meant that a dreary portrait of a government official 
was art, while a cubist painting by Picasso was not. As such, the representa- 
tional test was an arbitrary and overly restrictive definition which took no 
cognizance of currents of modern art. It was finally superseded in Bancusiv. 
United States.24 
In 1926 Edward Steichen, the photographer, purchased Bird in Space 
from Constantine Brancusi in France, and brought the work to the United 
States.25 The sculpture was invoiced as a bronze bird, a work of art, and 
assumed by Steichen to be free of duty. The customs officials who greeted 
Bird in Space considered the sculpture as an object of manufactured metal, 
and therefore taxable at forty percent of its value.26 The Customs Court, 
however, gave legal recognition to nonrepresentational forms of art, and held 
that Bird in Space was entitled to free entry. 
The significance of Brancusi for the development of art law was the 
judicial recognition that the standards relating to works of art must include 
special criteria which reflect the unique nature of the subject matter. The 
Brancusi court recognized that the statutory definitions in the t a r 8  act had to 
bend to meet artistic  development^.^' Nonetheless, the courts continued to 
struggle with distinctions between art and n ~ n - a r t ~ ~  until the 1958 amend- 
ments to the tariff art29 removed substantially all barriers to the free entry of 
modem and abstract art works in modem and abstract media and styles. 
United States v. Olivetti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46,48-49 (1916). The court noted that a 
marble font and two marble seats, although admittedly beautiful, were not art within the 
meaning of the Tariff Act since they were not representations of a natural object. 
24 T.D. 43063,54 TREAS. DEC. 428 (1928). 
25 The case is described in L. ADAMS, ART ON TRIAL 37 (1976). 
26 T a r 8  Act of 1922, ch. 356,42 Stat. 858. 
27 The court in Brancusi noted that: 
There has been developing a so-called new school of art, whose exponents attempt to 
portray abstract ideas rather than to imitate natural objects. Whether or not we are in 
sympathy with these newer ideas and the schools which represent them, we think the 
fact of their existence and their influence upon the art world as recognized by the courts 
must be considered. 
Brancusi v. United States, T.D. 43063,54 TREAS. DEC. 428,430-31 (1928). 
la L. DUBOFF, supra note 3, at 20. Customs courts have still not recognized the artistic merit of 
crafts or articles which may have a primarily utilitarian purpose, or which may be the product of 
an artisan. L. DUBOFF, suvra note 3, at 24. See Mayer v. United States, 18 C.C.P.A. 117 (1930) 
(imported antique diamond createdby artisan rather than artist subject to duty); H.W. St. John & 
Co v. United States, 65 Cust. Ct. 577 (1970) (stones imported for incorporation into columns used 
to support church roof not works of art). Antiques are classified as objects of the fine arts even 
though they may have a utilitarian purpose or were created by artisans. 19 U.S.C. $ 776.20 
(1970). Nor have reproductions and copies faredvery well. For sculptures only limited editions 
of ten or less are entitled to free entry. 19 U.S.C. 5- 1201 (1970). Art works imported for 
commercial use are ineligible for duty free entry. L. DUBOFF, supra note 3, at 58; Whitman 
Publishing Co. v. United States. 6 Cust. Ct. 65 (1941) (water color paintings conceived by Hritish 
artists for.;eproduction in children's book charged 15 percent dutyj. ~eeKeneralltj Derenberg& 
Raurn, Congress Rehabilitates Afodern Art, 34 S.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1959). 
29 T a r 8  Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-262,73 Stat. 549. 
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B.  The Legislative Response to Art 
Art law developed as the courts and legislators took cognizance that the 
unique nature of the arts required special legislative and judicial treatment. 
Existing regulations, practices, and statutes did not always protect the artist 
or the collecting public from the customary ways of doing business in the art 
world. New techniques in the reproduction of art, as well as the increase in 
the number of collectors, led New York, California, and one or two other 
states to redefine the property rights related to the reproduction of works of 
fine art. 
The Uniform Commercial Code deals generally with tangible personal 
property, rather than with the significant intangible rights emanating from art 
objects.30 While some have argued that the Uniform Commercial Code can be 
utilized to solve the problems relating to the sale and warranty of art works,3l 
others have felt that the Code protection was in~ufficient.~~ The legislatures 
of New York and California have sought to protect purchasers of art works 
through legislation making falsification of a certificate. of authenticity of a 
work of art a class A mi~derneanor.~~ Dealers who furnish a written instru- 
ment describing or identifying an art object with any author or authorship are 
presumed under these statutes to have included that description as part of the 
basis of the bargain, and to have created an express warranty with respect to 
the authenticity of such authorship as of the date of exchange. Disclaimers of 
warranty are limited to void unreasonable results if the work is proven to be a 
counterfeit, if the work is unqualifiedly stated to be the work of a named artist, 
and if it is found that as of the date of sale or exchange such statement was 
false, misleading, or erroneous.34 
California and IlTinois have pioneered legislation requiring elaborate 
disclosure of all informational details surrounding the sale of an edition of 
"original prints."35 In 1975, New York passed legislation prohibiting decep- 
tive acts in the sale of fine prints and posters.36 One commentator has criticized 
the overlegislation in this area because of legislators' impressions that for any 
arguable abuse, a separate law is necessary to protect the con~umer.~' 
The proliferation and perfection of modem techniques in printing and 
reproduction, however, may also make it easier for the unscrupulous to 
defraud untrained and unsophisticated purchasers. This feeling accounts for 
the current explosion in legislation protecting the collector, since the statutes 
aim to increase the information given to and understood by purchasers of fine 
arts. 
30 S .  FELDMAN & S. WEIL, supra note 2, at 287. 
3L Note, Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Solutions to Art Fraud and Forgery, 14 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 409 (1972). 
32 Feldman, New Protection forthe Art Collector - Warranties, Opinions and Discluimers, 23 
REC. 661 (1968). 
33 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 219-i (McKinney Supp. 1976). 
34 Id. 4 219-d. 
CAL. CN. CODE §§ 1740-1744 (West 1973); ILL. Ahw. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §$361-367 (Smith- 
Hart Supp. 1977). 
38 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW art. 12-H (McKinney Supp. 1976). 
37 Koegal, Recent Legislution, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1977, at 1. In the 1977 session of the New 
York State Legislature eight bills relating to the visual artswere introduced. 
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C. The Response of the Legal Profession: 
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts 
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts (VLA) began in New York in 1969 when 
four young lawyers assisted a few artist friends. It has grown to a program 
which provides legal assistance to over 500 different artists and arts organiza- 
tions in New York City alone. The VLA concept, which provides free legal 
representation by volunteer attorneys for individual artists and not-for-profit 
arts organizations that are unable to afford private counsel and have arts- 
related legal problems, has spread to nearly a dozen states. There are now 
VLA programs in many regions and cities, including Albany, Boston, Buffalo, 
Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Los Angeles, Poughkeepsie, Philadelphia, Ro- 
chester, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and the states of Iowa, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, and Oregon.38 
The Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts movement has influenced the devel- 
opment of new trends in representation, focused upon the legal needs of 
creative people.39 As in other areas of public interest law, once the beneficiar- 
ies of legal resources began to demand their legal rights the law became 
increasingly responsive to their demands. 
A. Artist-Dealer Relationships 
Works of art are generally sold in the United States on consignment, and 
most artists consign. their works to a dealer.40 Section 2-326 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, however, provides that consigned goods are subject to the 
claims of the dealer's creditors unless: there is a sign-posting procedure, which 
generally is not done; it is established that the dealer is known by his creditors 
to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others; and the required 
financing statement has been filed, which presents a substantial practical 
problem.41 
Unfortunately, many galleries experience financial difficulties within a 
short time after opening, and are forced to declare bankruptcy. The artist is 
most often in the position of a general creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings, 
and may not be able to recover his paintings. In response to the resulting 
hardship, statutes have been passed in New York and a few other states which 
exempt the consignor-consignee relation of the artist and dealer from the 
application of Section 2-326. These statutes, which clarify the inherently 
fiduciary character of the artist-dealer relationship and lay the legal founda- 
tion for the application of criminal sanctions, establish that the artist is to be 
considered a principal and the dealer his agent.42 
38 [1976] VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS ANN. REP. 6-7. 
39 S. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, supra note 2. 
40 Id. at 495. 
4L U.C.C. 5 2-326(3). 
42 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW art. 12-C (McKinney 1975). An equivalent California statute took 
effect on Jan. 1,1976. CAL. CIV. CODE 1738 (West 1976). 
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B. Artists' Housing 
Sufficient studio space and adequate housing accommodations are among 
the most pressing concerns of artists today. Often preferring an urban 
environment in which adequate housing is scarce and expensive, artists have 
turned to renting commercial facilities,for joint living and working space,43 
often in violation of zoning laws relating to the use of commercial property for 
residential purposes. New York has provided for the special needs of artists, 
and at the same time restored a declining area of New Y ork City, by amending 
the Multiple Dwelling Law44 to permit joint living and working space in the 
Soho The revitalized artistic community which has resulted from this 
move suggests that similar projects may be profitably instituted in other cities. 
C .  Artists' Reserved Rights 
The rallying cry for the artists' rights movement has been "artists' reserved 
rights" - a demand by artists that they should have a reserved right in their 
artwork after its initial sale, and should receive a royalty should the work 
increase in value upon resale by the original purchaser. 
In the United States most artists are compensated for their work through a 
fee minus a dealer commission of thirty to fifty percent. Unless contractually 
agreed otherwise, the artist will not receive any financial benefit should the 
artwork greatly increase in value. The artists' reserved right, or droit de suite 
is not a new idea. Such legislation exists in Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Tunisia, and U r u g ~ a y . ~ ~  In January, 
1977, California became the first American jurisdiction to enact the droit de 
suite, mandating that artists are to receive a royalty upon the resale of their 
The demands for an American equivalent to the droit de suite can be 
traced to the 1940's, but the greatest impetus came from the Scull sale at 
Sotheby Parke Bernet in 1973.48 Robert Rauschenberg's "Thaw," sold to 
collector Robert Scull for $900 in 1958, was subsequently resold for $85,000 at 
43 VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, HOUSING FOR ARTISTS: THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 1 
(1976). 
44 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW $5 276-278 (McKinney 1971). 
45 VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, HOUSING FOR ~ ~ S T S :  THENEW YORK EXPERIENCE 14-33 
(1976). While the recycling of commercial buildings into residential buildings was initially for 
artists alone, legislation in 1976 expanded the areas in which such conversions could take place 
and permitted non-artists to reside in lofts. Id. at B-8(a). 
4s Hochf~eld, Artist Rights: Pros and Cons, Art News, May, 1975, at 23. In Europe, legislation 
pertaining to artists' reserved rights differs with respect to the resales covered, the percentage of 
the resale price that the artist obtains, the minimum price before which the reserved right ' 
mechanism is brought into play, and the length of time during which it operates. Price & Price, 
Rights of Artists: The Case of the Droit d e  Suite, 31 ART J .  144 (1971). See generally Price, 
Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the Droit deSuite, 77 YALE L. 
J . 1333 (1968). 
47 CAI. CIV. CODE $986 (West 1977). 
48 In 1940 the artist Grant Wood, angered that his painting Daughters of  Reuolrction had 
trebled in value within a few years, announced that a new work, Parson Weems Fable woilld be 
sold with the stipulation that subsequent sales would bring him fifty percent of the appreciated 
value. Hochfield, Artists Rights: Pros and Cons, Art News, May, 1975, at 20. It is not known 
whether Wood carried through with his threat. 
Heinonline 26 Clev. St. L. Rev. 488 1977 
19771 THE EMERGENCE OF ART LAW 489 
a profit of 9,333 percent. Rauschenberg confronted Scull at the auction, and 
later told the Wall Street Journal, "[flrom now on, I want a royalty on the 
resale and I am going to get it."49 
Previously, in 1971, a New York lawyer, Robert Projansky, and a Soho 
dealer, Seth Siegelaub, developed "The Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and 
Sale Agreement,"50 which was an attempt to accomplish contractually much 
of what the California legislation has more recently attempted to provide. 
The Projansky Agreement, as it came to be called, was a contract designed 
to give the artist fifteen percent of any increase in the value of his work each 
time it was transferred, facilitated by the inclusion of a record of who owned 
the work at any given time. Not surprisingly, collectors were reluctant to sign 
the Projansky Agreement, and almost none were willing to execute the 
contract as written. 
A few years later another New York attorney, Charles Jurrist, developed a 
contract based loosely on the Projansky Agreement. It was simpler and more 
practicable, and achieved many of the results to which the Projansky contract 
was addressed. The Jurrist contract sought a more modest package of rights 
for the artist, and provided safeguards for the collector in an effort to make the 
contract more palatable to him. Unlike the Projansky contract, the Jurrist 
agreement sought to obtain a fifteen percent royalty for the artist only on the 
first resale of the work. This eliminated the very complicated system of 
ongoing contracts and did not unduly restrict transferability. 
Under the Projansky agreement the collector could only sell to a purchaser 
who himself would enter into a Projansky agreement with the artist. Despite 
its less restrictive provisions, the Jurrist agreement was no more successful in 
this respect. Most artists who tried to use the agreements had to forego sales 
or take out the reserved rights clause, though some of the other goals relating 
to care and exhibition rights were often achieved. The problem with both 
contractual arrangements was that they did not reflect the power realitites of 
the art world. The economics of the art marketplace are such that only those 
artists who can make their own market, like Robert Rauschenberg, can use 
such contracts successfully. 
The California Resale Royalties Act provides for a five percent royalty of 
the gross resale price when the work has a fair market value of at least $1,000, 
is sold at a profit, and either the seller of the work resides in or the sale takes 
place in California. The royalty cannot be transferred, and can only be 
49 Ricklefs, Artists Decide They Should Share Profits on Resale o f  Paintings, Wall. St. J .  Feb. 
11,1974, at 1, col. 4. 
50 Under the contract, the artist received a guarantee that the work would remain unaltered by 
the owner. The artist had the right to be notified if the work were to be exhibited, the right to 
show the work for two months every five years at no cost to the owner, the right to be  consulted if 
restoration became necessary, one half of any rental income paid for the work, and all 
reproduction rights. Benefits from the appreciated resale value would accrue to the owner for 
his lifetime plus the life of his surviving spouse plus twenty-one years. If the owner died, the heirs 
would pay 15percent of the difference between the fair market value of the work at the time of 
the transfer to them and the price paid for it by the deceased, assuming the current market value 
was greater. If the work was destroyed by fire, the artist would receive 15 percent of the 
insurance. 
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waived by a written agreement providing for a royalty in excess of five 
percent of the gross resale price.51 
It is the responsibility of the seller or his agent to locate and pay the 
and if the artist is not located and paid within ninety days the resale royalty is 
to be transferred to the California Arts Council, which is to place the funds in 
an escrow account and attempt to locate the artist.53 If the artist is not found 
within seven years, the money is to be transferred to the Council's operating 
fund.54 
If the seller or his agent fails to pay the royalty, the artist may bring an 
action for damages against the seller within three years after the date of the 
sale or one year after the discovery of the resale, whichever is later.55 The 
statute does not apply to the initial sale or to resale after the death of the artist. 
Nor does it apply to resale where the gross sales price is less than the purchase 
price paid by the seller. The statute only applies to fine arts - original 
paintings, works of sculpture, or drawingss6 - and thus prints and works 
produced by other multiple reproduction techniques are not included. 
The statute has been upheld by a California district court.57 Congressman 
Henry A. Waxman has introduced a bill to establish resale royalties on a 
federal Federal legislation is the only promising approach to a 
success. The problem with all artists' reserved rights legislation is that it tends 
to help only those that can help themselves, and fails to benefit the over- 
whelming number of poor artists for whom a resale market is a dream which 
appears only after the more pressing need of selling to any purchaser is 
achieved. Nonetheless, reserved rights legislation has served a useful role in 
rallying artists to general questions relating to artists' rights. 
D. Droit Moral 
Until 1977 American law had not recognized that artists might have a 
moral or personal right in their work which transcended or outlasted their 
ownership right. The droit moral, or moral right of the artist, is a concept in 
French and European law which legally recognizes that a "moral right" or 
integrity remains to the creator of the work even after the work is sold. In the 
law of France and other Western European countries, artistic rights involve 
not only a property right and copyright, but a second element - a moral or 
nonproperty attribute of intellectual and moral character which gives legal 
expression to an intimate bond existing between an artistic work and the 
author.59 The moral right of the author is considered a right of personalty as 
CAL. CIV. CODE Q986(a) (West 1977). 
52 Id. Q986(a) (2)(4). 
53 Id. Q986(a) (2)(5). 
54 Id. Q986(a)(5). 
5 V d .  Q 986(a)(3). 
56 Id. Q 986(c) (2). 
Morseburg v. Balyon, No. CV24-7210RMT (C.D. Cal. March 23,1978). 
58 H.R. 11403 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978). 
Sarraute, Current Theory of the Moral Rights of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 
AM. J .  COW. L. 465 (1968). 
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opposed to a property right.60 This ongoing non-economic right or interest 
remains even after the artist has sold the work and no longer retains possession 
or ownership of the specific object.8' 
There has as yet been no judicial recognition of the artist's moral right in 
the United States. If the owner of an important sculpture by Mark diSuvero 
should go mad, pull out his blow torch, and melt his diSuvero into a 
nondescript lump, there is little that anyone could do. Absent a specific 
clause in the contract of sale, diSuvero would be powerless.62 
One of the few attempts to obtain judicial recognition of the droit moral 
failed.63 In Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, Alfred D .  Crimi had been 
commissioned to create a fresco in a church. After completion some of the 
parishioners objected to the mural, feeling that Crimi's portrayal of Christ 
with so much of his chest bare placed more emphasis on his physical attributes 
than his spiritual qualities. In 1947, eight years after its completion, the mural 
was painted over. Crimi brought suit to compel the congregation to have the 
frescoes restored or removed and to pay damages. The court held that no 
rights, moral or otherwise, were reserved to the artist, and that if the artist had 
wanted to reserve such rights, he would have to do so by contract.64 
In 1977, the first legislative recognition of the artist's moral right occurred 
under the California Art and Public Buildings Act, a "percent for art statute" 
which requires the state architect in consultation with the California Arts 
Council to purchase commissioned works of art for placement in state 
 building^.^^ The statute specifically requires the state architect to respect the 
moral rights of every artist whose work is purchased or commissioned. The 
state architect must "insure that every work of art . . . is properly main- 
tained and is not artistically altered in any manner without the consent of the 
artist."66 The artist retains the following intangible rights: 
(1) the right to claim authorship of the work of art. 
(2) the right to reproduce such works of art including all rights to 
which the work of art may be subject under copyright laws. 
(3) if provided by written contract, the right to receive a specified 
percentage of the proceeds if the work of art is subsequently sold by 
the state to a third party. . . . 87 
~ G e r r y m e n ,  The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L. J. 1023,1025 (1976). 
Professor Merryman has termed the droit moral a composite right which includes: the right 
to respect a work of art, that is, the right of integrity which consists of the right to respect the work 
of art as it was created by the artisl; the right of paternity, which is the right of the artist to insist 
that his work be associated with his name; and the right of divulgation, that is, the artist's right to 
withhold his work which relates to the artist's absolute right to decide when a work of art is 
complete and when to show it to the public. Id. at 1027. 
G2 The result might be different if the work was located in a museum and the destruction was 
attempted by the museum. A museum has a different relationship to the public and is regulated 
by the state attorney general. For instance, N.Y. EDUC. LAW $ 264 (McKinney 1976) makes 
vandalism of art works in museums a criminal act. Di Suvero might have a tort remedy if the mad 
collector attempted to resell or exhibit the work. See S. FELDMAN & S. WEE, supra note 2, at 15- 
17. 
Crimiv. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570,89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
84 Id. at 576-77,89 N.Y.S.2d at 819. 
Os CAL. G ~ v ' T  CODE $ 15813 (West 1977). See Sandison, California Enact Droit Moral and 
Droit de Suite, ART & THE LAW, Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 3. 
CAL. G ~ v ' T  CODE $15813.3(e) (West 1977). 
67 Id, Q 15813.5(a). 
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These rights can be extended to the artist's heirs by written contract for 
twenty years following the artist's death.08 In what one commentator has 
referred to as the first appearance of a Mirandasg rule for artists' rights the 
artist must be informed "in writing of all the rights specified which may be 
granted to the artist or to the artist's heirs."'O 
Though new to American jurisprudence, the California statute may serve 
as a prelude to similar legislation on the federal and state levels, as evidenced 
by the droit moral bill recently introduced by Congressman Drinan in the 
House of Representatives as an amendment to the Copyright Act.71 
E.  Copyright and the Visual Artist 
Visual artists have generally been reluctant to avail themselves of copy- 
right protection for their work. Many artists feel that the copyright notice is 
an intrusion upon their artistic statement, a defacement of their work, and an 
excessive capitulation to the m a r k e t p l a ~ e . ~ ~  Of more economic significance 
is that many dealers and collectors are reluctant to purchase works of art 
bearing a copyright notice.73 
The consequences of the failure to copyright artworks can be disastrous to 
the artist. Millions of dollars were made on Robert Indiana's design of 
LOVE, but the artist received not one cent from commercial exploitation due 
to his failure to copyright the 
Aside from artistic reluctance to utilize the copyright notice, copyright 
principles are not fundamentally applicable to the visual arts for they are 
based upon usage for multiples. The value of a work of art is in its singularity, 
while the value of a song or a book is that it is created to be reproduced. 
Unlike most books, musical works, motion pictures, sound recordings, and 
dramatic, pantomime, and choreographic works, the initialvalue of a work of 
art usually inures in the master work or original, rather than in its reproductive 
potential.75 For monumental sculptures, the original is the final commercial 
outlet for exploiting the artistic notion. For other classes of copyrightable 
subject matter, the economic motivation for creating the work is eventual 
repetition or reproduction, and not merely a single sale of a single copy of the 
underlying 
The visual artist has done fairly well under the Copyright Act of 1976, 
which for the first time at least implicitly recognizes the distinction between 
68 Id. $15813.5(b). 
69 Miranda v. Arizona, 364 U .S. 436 (1986). 
Sandison, supra note 65, at 4; CAL. GOvi CODE Q 15813.5(c) (West 1977). 
H.R. 8261 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
7e Brenner, A Two-Phase Approach to Copyrighting the Fine Arts, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 
85,102 (1976). In most European countries there is no notice requirement. 
l3 In a survey to determine why visual artists did not use the statutory copyright, the 
researcher questioned 45 gallery owners; 57.7% of the galleries surveyed felt that the copyright 
notice defaced an art work, and that the uniqueness of the show would be diluted by the 
suggestion implied by the notice that the works were not necessarily one of a kind. Sheehan, 
Why Don't Fine Artists Use Statutory Copyright?, 22 BULL. COPY RIG^ SOC'Y 242,257 (1975). 
l4 Indiana now regularly copyrights his work. 
l5 Brenner, supra note 72, at 86. 
Id. at 87. 
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works of fine art and other subjects of copyright, and provides an escape valve 
from the copyright notice.77 Under Section 101, the term "copies" includes 
the original or master in which the work is first affixed. Thus, in the context of 
the copyright law an original work of art comes under the definition of 
" 
copies." However, a sale of original or a small number of copies to the 
public without notice does not invalidate the copyrights of such works,7s and 
the copyright owner need not take any corrective action to validate the 
copyright involved.79 
The sale of an original graphic or sculptural work without copyright notice 
will not automatically divest the artist of his copyright. The duty to affix 
notice will arise when the work of art becomes a source for r ep roduc t i~n .~~  
Thus, the duty to affix notice will arise from multiple run reproductions, but 
not for very limited editions of "relatively small" number. Under Section 
405(a)(2) the artist must register the work within five years after publication 
without notice. The artist must then make a "reasonable effort" to add the 
notice to all copies which have been distributed to the public after the 
omission has been discovered. 
For the artist who does place a copyright notice on his work, the 
requirements are stricter. Under prior law, the absence of the year of date of 
first publication in a copyright notice was ac~eptable.~'  The new Act 
provides that the date must be present in the copyright notice if one is used. 
Under proposed regulations recently published by the Registrar, there is 
no longer any excuse for artists not to use the copyright notice. Notice may 
be placed directly or by means of a label that is cemented, sewn or otherwise 
properly secured, or it can be placed on the backing, mounting, framing, or 
other material to which the work is attached. For three-dimensional works, 
notice can be placed directly on or by means of a label cemented, sewn or 
otherwise ~ermanently secured to any visible portion of the three- 
dimensional work or to any base, mounting, framing or other material to 
which the work is attached. If the work is of a physical nature that does not 
lend itself to the notice being written directly on the work or written on a 
label, the notice may appear on a durable tag attached to the copy with 
sufficient permanency that it will remain with the copy during the entire time 
of the 
Other sections of the copyright revision recognize certain problems and 
needs of the visual arts. For the first time in history, applied arts and works of 
artistic craftsmanship are given statutory recognition as the subject matter of 
c ~ p y r i g h t . ~ ~  The originality requirement could cause a problem for artists. 
77 See generally Gottlieb & Nolen, Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural Works Under the New 
Act, in 1 PLI, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRICITT LAW 501 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Got- 
tlieb & Nolan]. 
Copyright Act of 1976,17 U.S.C.A. 405(a)(l) (West Supp. 1977). 
79 Gottlieb & Nolan, supra note 77, at 512; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 
(1976) [hereinafter cited HOUSE REPORT]. 
Brenner, supra note 72, at 113. 
Gottlieb & Nolan, supra note77, at511; 17 U.S.C. 5 19 (1970); Fleischer Studios Inc. v. Ralph 
A. Freundlich Inc., 73 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1934). 
82 42 Fed. Reg. 64374 (1977), to be codified in 37 C.F.R. 5 201.2(i). 
83 Id. g 101. 
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Section 101 makes a distinction between designs that can at least conceptual- 
ly be identified separately and exist independently from utilitarian aspects of 
the useful article in which they are embodied, and those designs which 
cannot. Only the former are c~pyr ightable .~~ The House Report would not 
allow copyright for shapes of automobiles, airplanes, or food  processor^.^^ 
Thus, an artist who took an automobile tire and placed his name on the rim of 
the tire with a copyright notice and the year of publication - clearly a 
possibility these days - would probably not be  granted copyright protection. 
Of special importance is the resolution of the long-time controversy over 
whether a display of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works in a gallery 
exhibition should be considered "publication." The new law specifically 
states that the public display of a work at a gallery is not a publication.s8 
One area in which visual artists made their presence known concerns the 
strict depository requirements of two complete copies of the best edition. 
Each copy of a small edition of a graphic work may have a substantial 
economic value, and to require artists to deposit two copies imposes a very 
difficult burden. With the visual artist specifically in mind, the statute 
provides that the Register of Copyrights may issue regulations to exempt any 
categories of material from the depository requirement, or to provide 
alternative forms of deposit.87 Regulations recently promulgated under this 
authority permit a deposit of photographs for any work in an edition of no 
more than 300. Visual artists have also benefitted in that the transfer of 
ownership of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work does not convey rights of 
reproduction in the absence of a written agreement.8s 
Overall, the visual artist's needs have been recognized in the recent 
revision of the copyright law. From a theoretical perspective, however, 
original art works do not fit properly into copyright categories, and copyright 
remains primarily a legal device to protect reproductive rights. One hopes 
that the subtle recognition in the revision that an original work of art will not 
lose copyright protection if it does not have the notice affixed will eventually 
84 Gottlieb & Nolan, supra note 77, at 509; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 79, at 55, in which it is 
stated that "unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television 
set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be 
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be 
copyrighted under the bill." 
85 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 79, at 58. 
se Copyright Act of 1976,17 U.S.C.A. Q 101 (West Supp. 1977); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 79, 
at 63-64. 
87 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. Q 407(c) (West Supp. 1977). This section also states 
that: 
[sluch regulations shall provide either for complete exemption from the deposit 
requirements of this.section, or for alternative forms of deposit aimed at providing a 
satisfactory archival record of a work without imposing practical or financial hardships 
on the depositor, where the individual author is the owner of copyright in a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work and (i) less than five copies of the work have been published, 
or (ii) the work has been published in a limited edition consisting of numbered copies, 
the monetary value of which would make the mandatory deposit of two copies of the 
best edition of the work burdensome, unfair, or unreasonable. 
Id. QQ U)2,204(a). These sections overrule Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, Inc., 287 
N.Y. 302,39 N.E.2d 249 (1942). Several states had reached the results codified in sections 202 and 
204(a). See, e.g., N.Y. GEN.'BUS. LAW Q 224 (McKinney 1968); CAL. CIV. CODE Q 982(c) (West 
Supp. 1977). 
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become an explicit statutory recognition that art works are exempt from the 
statutory formalities of copyright until such time as the work is to be repro- 
duced. 
IV. LESS DEVELOPED AREAS: FEDERAL TAXATION 
As illustrated in the above discussion of copyright, many areas of law have 
not yet begun to respond to the particularized needs of the visual artist, and by 
subsuming the visual arts under more general rules a sometimes uncomforta- 
ble fit has been forced. The area of federal income taxation has been 
problematic for the visual artist because of the failure by Congress and the 
Internal Revenue Service to recognize special needs of the arts. There are 
dire consequences to the artist, particularly the poor artist, in the ignoring of 
these needs. 
A. The Home Ofice Deduction 
The tightening of the home office deduction under the Tax Reform Act of 
1976 has created real problems for the visual artist.89 Under the new 
provisions, a deduction may be taken for the maintenance of a home office if: 
(i) it is the principal place of business; (ii) it is used exclusively as a place of 
business by the taxpayer in meeting or dealing with patients, clients, or 
customers in the normal course of business; (iii) it is used for storage of 
inventory which the taxpayer sells at retail or wholesale in the normal course 
of business, but only if the residence is the taxpayer's only fixed place of 
business; or (iv) if the home office is a separate structure not attached to the 
dwelling unit in which the taxpayer resides, used exclusively "in connection 
with" the taxpayer's business, and any portion of the residence is rented to 
someone else.g0 
Under these new provisions an artist may deduct his or her rent or 
maintenance allocable to space in the apartment .or loft which is exclusively 
used as artists' principal art studio. Unlike the old law, there is no mixed or 
allocated use of an artist's studio. That is, the artist can no longer use a studio 
area for both living and working purposes. This means the artist must 
rigorously delimit space for the exclusive use of his artistic activities. 
Congress apparently did not intend to harm the artist through this 
tightening of the deduction. The Committee Report discussing the provision 
that a separate structure not attached to the dwelling may be used for the 
home office deduction cited as the only example of a separate structure "an 
artist's studio in a structure adjacent to but unattached to his re~ idence . "~~  
This is of benefit to suburban or rural artists who have converted barns into 
studios, but does not reflect the urban reality of artists who live and work in 
large, single-roomed lofts. 
Of greater difficulty to the poor artist is that the annual business deduction 
for the business portion of the residence may not exceed the annual gross 
89 I.R.C. 5 280A. 
Id. 
91 S. REP. NO. 938,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 148, r ep~h ted  in [I9761 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 
3439,3580. 
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income from the business minus the non-business deductions - that is, those 
available without regard to business activity.92 This means that if an artist 
sells no paintings in a particular year, he can no longer make use of the home 
office deduction. One cannot have a loss resulting from the use of a studio. 
This has a particularly severe result for the average artist who has an 
intermittant market. Studio expenses are ongoing, and there may be  years 
when no paintings are sold. Louise Nevelson, for instance, did not sell a 
single piece of art until she was fifty-six years old, though she presented her 
first one-woman show at the age of f ~ r t y - o n e . ~ ~  In this respect, the home 
office restriction simply does not take into account the realities of the art 
market. 
B.  Artists' Charitable Contributions 
The Tax Reform Act of 196gg4 excluded from the definition of capital 
asset, and therefore from the tax advantages of capital gains treatment, 
copyright interests and literary, musical, or artistic compositions, as well as 
letters, memoranda, or similar property when in the hands of the taxpayer 
whose personal efforts created the property.95 If an artist donates one of his 
works to a tax exempt institution, the allowable deduction is computed by 
reducing the fair market value of the work by the amount of appreciation of 
such property. Thus, the artist may deduct from adjusted gross income only 
the cost of materials he utilized to create the work. However, the collector or 
one who has obtained the work of art from the creator who has contributed 
the same work to a non-profit institution may treat the work as a capital asset, 
and therefore deduct a portion of the fair market value of the work from his 
adjusted gross income.98 
The result of this change in the tax laws is that artists have substantially 
reduced their donations to museums. In response, legislation was introduced 
in 1976 to enable the artist under specified circumstances to deduct from his 
adjusted gross income seventy-five percent of the fair market value of his 
work which he contributes to nonprofit in~titutions.~' The artist could have 
deducted in any one year a maximum of $25,000, but the deduction could not 
exceed the taxpayer's gross income for such year from the sale of art work. 
The bill died in conference. 
Similar bills have been introduced in the current session which would 
allow the artist to receive a tax credit for the contribution of art works.98 The 
Treasury opposes these bills on the ground that artists are providing services 
in such circumstances which for other groups are generally non-deductible. 
The Treasury feels that the lost donations will eventually come from artists' 
92 I.R.C. $ 280A(c)(5). 
93 Conroy, Form and Function, Washington Post, Feb. 20,1977, at 1, col. 1. 
94 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 
I.R.C.). 
95 I.R.C. 1221. 
96 Id. $170. 
97 S. 1435,94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The corresponding House Bill was H.R. 6057. 
98 S. 1384,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 439,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The bill would 
provide a tax credit of 30 percent of the fair market value of contributions to $35,000. 
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estates, and that there is justification for giving preferred treatment to 
collectors because they had paid for the works initially.ee 
C .  Estate Tax: Carryover Basis 
The reform of the laws governing estate taxation has, perhaps unintention- 
ally, caused problems for artists' estates. Under prior law, artists' heirs 
received capital gains treatment for profits received by them from the sale of 
inherited art works that were in excess of fair market value at the date of 
death.lO0 Under the new law, the heirs are taxed at ordinary rather than 
capital gains rates on the difference between the original cost of the art work 
to the decedent and the sale price received by the artist's heirs. This new 
basis is due to the interplay of section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which excludes from the definition of capital asset an artistic composition by 
one who created the property,lo1 and a new carryover basis rule for property 
acquired or passing from a decedent, which provides that the inheritor of 
property will take the same basis in property for determining gain or loss as 
the decedent had immediately before death, subject to certain adjustments.lo2 
Because of the carryover, a gain realized by the sale of art work by the artist's 
estate will be treated as ordinary income.lo3 
These and similar problems result in part from a move toward simplifica- 
tion and reform in the system of federal estate taxation, at a time when artists 
are seeking special assistance in meeting their specialized needs. As in other 
areas of taxation, the affluent artist can often utilize the tax laws to some 
benefit; the poor artist cannot. 
This Article has discussed but a few areas of the law in which special 
approaches to the specific needs of the arts have been developed, and others, 
such as federal income taxation, in which these needs have been ignored. Art 
law is a developing legal specialty. Its parameters are not yet fixed. While 
in many respects the law and the legal community are not yet fully responsive 
to the particularized needs of the artist, it is clear that the process of 
refinement and accomodation of legal thought in this area will continue. 
99 Art and Taxes on the Menu at Mrs. Mondale's Luncheon, N . Y .  Times, June2,1977, at 16, col. 
3. 
lo0 Gorewitz, Effect of 1976 Tax Reform Act on Artists' Estate and Gift  Taxes, ART & THE 
LAW, Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 5 .  
lol I.R.C. $ 1221. 
lo2 I.R.C. $ 1023. 
lo3 Gorewitz, supra note 100, at 6 .  
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